In their article ’Is Pregnancy a Disease? A Normative Approach’, Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen contend that, on several of the most prominent accounts of disease, pregnancy should be considered a disease. More specifically, of the five accounts they discuss, each renders pregnancy a disease or suffers serious conceptual problems otherwise. They take issue specifically with the dysfunction account of disease and argue that it suffers several theoretical difficulties. In this response, we focus on defending the dysfunction account against their (...) main objections and show why a version of the dysfunction account is viable on account of the indispensability of normativity in biology and medicine. After disarming their main objections to the dysfunction account, we briefly respond to their treatment of the normality of pregnancy and then draw a distinction between adverse symptoms and underlying causes to show why even though pregnancy may have ’disease-like’ features, it is not a disease. (shrink)

In his plea for consensual democracy in Africa, Kwasi Wiredu recommends unanimity about what is to be done, not what ought to be done, or unanimity on action rather than unanimity of values, beliefs and opinion. I caution the use of this procedural instrument by showing that some issues are so value-laden that a group decision cannot be value-neutral. It may sometimes be more productive to entertain value differences to keep them from going underground and becoming dangerous. However, the ability (...) to locate some common interest or ground seems to be crucial for such value confrontation. (shrink)

One of the most influential philosophers of our day has selected 16 previously uncollected pieces that are unified by Levinas's project of revising the phenomenological description of the world in light of our experience of other persons.

The ethics of conducting research in epidemic situations have yet to account fully for differences in the proportion and acuteness of epidemics, among other factors. While epidemics most often arise from infectious diseases, not all infectious diseases are of epidemic proportions, and not all epidemics occur acutely. These and other variations constrain the generalization of ethical decision‐making and impose ethical demands on the individual researcher in a way not previously highlighted. This paper discusses a number of such constraints and impositions. (...) It applies the ethical principles enunciated by Emmanuel et al.1 to the controversial Pfizer study in Nigeria in order to highlight the particular ethical concerns of acute epidemic research, and suggest ways of meeting such challenges.The paper recommends that research during epidemics should be partly evaluated on its own merits in order to determine its ethical appropriateness to the specific situation. Snap decisions to conduct research during acute epidemics should be resisted. Community engagement, public notification and good information management are needed to promote the ethics of conducting research during acute epidemics. Individual consent is most at risk of being compromised, and every effort should be made to ensure that it is maintained and valid. Use of data safety management boards should be routine. Acute epidemics also present opportunities to enhance the social value of research and maximize its benefits to communities.Ethical research is possible in acute epidemics, if the potential challenges are thought of ahead of time and appropriate precautions taken. (shrink)

Le terme de « personne » est devenu aujourd’hui très abstrait, y compris dans le personnalisme, et il est nécessaire de lui redonner le statut d’un vrai concept. Une telle tâche est rendue possible par la méthode de la phénoménologie qui seule peut être attentive à l’identité propre de la personne par rapport à l’identité de la chose. Contre le concept juridique de personne et contre les pensées de l’identité personnelle issues de Locke, Husserl permet de montrer en quoi l’identité (...) personnelle n’est pas simplement l’identité passée formée par le souvenir, mais qu’elle est l’identité présente que le sujet se donne dans le temps, dans la chair et dans la vie de la volonté. Heidegger, lui, permet de faire un pas de plus dans l’analyse du caractère concret de la personne en montrant que, antérieurement au sujet qui se forme lui-même, la personne est cet être qui découvre ses possibilités les plus propres à partir de sa vie dans le monde ; la personne est alors ce qu’elle a à être. Il est ainsi possible, en se libérant de toute idée de constance, de retrouver la dimension relationnelle et responsive de la personne qui était au centre de la philosophie médiévale.The term of « person » has become very abstract today, as well in personalism, ant it is necessary to regive it the status of a concept. This has been made possible by the method of phenomenology which alone can be attentive to the actual identity of the person compared with the identity of thing. Against the juridical concept of person, and against the philosophy of personal identity since Locke, Husserl shows how the personal identity is no simply our past identity formed by the memory, but that it is the present identity that the subject develops over time, in the life and flesh of our will. Heidegger allows to go one step further in the analysis of the concrete character of the person by showing that prior to the subject that forms itself, the person is his being who discovers his own possibilities from what he experiences in life ; the person thus becomes what he has to be. It is necessary to show, free ourselves from all idea of constancy, that person is defined by relation and reply. (shrink)

The interpretation of Marx’s references to work and to domination is a vexed question. Can we say that Marx criticizes capitalism in terms of its effects on work? Or does he criticize capitalism from the standpoint of those subject to domination, and with whom his position is one of solidarity? Or does he elaborate a description of the unprecedented transformations brought about in the relations of power, which the category of domination is unable to apprehend effectively? The article argues that (...) these differences in interpretation are actually based on a series of false oppositions. Marx’s aim is in effect to articulate the question of the domination of work and the question of domination at work, insofar as he accords a position of political centrality to the connection between domination and work. (shrink)

The category of « postmemory » has been invoked by Marianne Hirsch to refer to a traumatic past which is not directly remembered in first person, but is handed down to later generations and is recalled through the mediation of narratives and images which become “prostheses” for a lack of direct memory. But how is it that these prosthetic recollections do not simply substitute for what lacks but seem to shape the very events they are meant to reproduce ? How (...) come an event continues to haunt the memories of the present, even when no immediate remembrance of it is left ? How to think of an “afterimage” of something that was never seen in the first place? It is only quite recently that the role of prosthetic images has been more widely acknowledged in the construction and creation of memories of collective trauma. The paper will focus on the role of photographic images played in remembrance of the Armenian genocide. It shall be shown how the few pictures that were taken by witnesses of the deportations had an afterlife of their own, being reframed and receiving specific interpretations. In particular, the paper will discuss the case of Armin T. Wegner, a German voluntary serving as Sanitary Officer in the Turkish army who, during his fieldwork in 1915/16 in Anatolia and on the Euphrates in Syria, documented the final stages of deportation, taking pictures of the camps at the desert’s fringes. His photos, which are among the most important visual testimonies of the extermination, only belatedly later made Wegner aware of what he had been witnessing, turning him into a witness après coup and to a defender of the Armenian cause. (shrink)

I revisit in this article the question of the possibility of political integration of the Afri- can continent, something rst proposed by Kwame Nkrumah and then re-proposed by Muamar Gaddaf . My focus here is not to examine the extent of African leaders’ willing- ness to bring about integration, nor will I concentrate on the political intrigues surround- ing it (though these will be brie y acknowledged). Further, I will not contest Nkrumah’s economic argument (which is commonsensically correct and in (...) line with mainstream eco- nomics) but will, instead, take up the more normative question of the possibility, and thus practicability, of political integration in light of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity on the continent. I argue that political integration is possible, and I support the gradualist view- point by drawing lessons from Nicholas Taleb’s concept of antifragility and pointing out that there is almost as much heterogeneity at individual and simpler society levels as there is in ethnically diverse societies. (shrink)

Building on Seumas Miller’s concept of corruption leads me to conclude that the question of disposition is central to the concept of corruption, which prompts me to consider punishment theories with regard to deterring dispositions to corruption. However, problems with punishment as a stand-alone approach lead me to consider institutional reform recommendations. Although institutional reforms have the weakness of merely engaging corrupt disposition in a hide-and-seek game, I seek to reconcile institutional approaches and moral individualism by suggesting that the former (...) is intended to aid the latter, in the sense that resisting corruption is a question of cost, and the onus is to determine how to reduce this cost. In this regard, prevailing proposals are inept without an enabling environment: public deliberation (comprising publicity and deliberation) is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for combating corruption, because it (1) compels reason to function at its best, (2) demands rational accountability, and therefore account-giving, (3) increases ‘common-good’ thinking, (4) facilitates the recruitment of responsible institutional role-occupants, and (5) is a self-correcting instrument. (shrink)

La demande éducative ne peut être réduite à une résistance à la psychanalyse. Elle doit être resituée dans la contextualité sociale historique et par rapport au sens et à la fonctionnalité de l’échec scolaire comme syndrome ethnique. C’est dans cette perspective anthropologique et institutionnelle que l’auteur propose de réinterroger les relations entre demandes éducatives et psychanalyse, en illustrant son propos par des observations permettant de repérer les conflictualités et les paradoxes présents dans la clinique contemporaine.

Les discours psychanalytiques sur les normes en matière de sexualité ont souvent conduit à une double opposition : une opposition entre l’approche psychanalytique de la sexualité et d’autres discours : moral, religieux, politique, social et culturel ; une opposition au sein même du champ psychanalytique entre différents courants. Cet article propose l’étude de cette deuxième controverse à partir de trois versions socio-historiques de cette question : la transgression, la perversion et la subversion. L’apparition de chacune d’entre elles fait apparaître des (...) oppositions théoriques dans le champ de la psychanalyse qui conduisent parfois jusqu’à des scissions. Ces oppositions ne seraient-elles pas parfois le reflet de positions idéologiques et/ou traduiraient-elles la difficulté de composer avec d’autres approches? (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que le Bien ? Quel rapport entretient-il avec l’être humain, comment relie-t-il les individus entre eux ? Nous verrons ici abordé un thème qui n’est ni tout à fait de l’histoire, ni tout à fait de la philosophie : mais un mélange des deux, une vision morale et philosophique du monde incarnée par un groupe d’intellectuels cambridgiens qui, avant d’être..

Résumé — La controverse religieuse qui a suivi l’essor du luthéranisme est ordinairement présentée comme le moteur principal de la reviviscence du pyrrhonisme à l’âge moderne. Au XVIe siècle, la religion aurait fait du pyrrhonisme un outil apologétique puissant, véritable arme que s’opposeraient les diverses confessions. Pourtant, comme le note Bayle dans son Dictionnaire, les rapports entre le scepticisme et la théologie sont extrêmement ambigus : un rapide tableau des appréciations portées par les théologiens chrétiens montrent que, chez les Réformés (...) comme chez les catholiques, l’humiliation des lumières naturelles est pensée comme une entrave à l’instauration de la foi. Seuls les courants pauliniens et mystiques voient dans cette philosophie un moyen bénéfique à la vie spirituelle. Pour devenir un outil intellectuel reconnu dans les milieux catholiques tridentins, le pyrrhonisme a dû subir une métamorphose radicale : Omer Talon, suivi par Gentian Hervet, ont reconfiguré le pyrrhonisme à partir du modèle probabiliste de la Nouvelle Académie, pourtant récusé par Sextus Empiricus. Assoupli, le scepticisme a alors été pensé comme le moyen privilégié d’une refondation de la dialectique rationaliste et de la défense de la foi.— The religious controversy which followed the development of Lutheranism is usually presented as the main engine of the revivescence of the Pyrrhonism in early modern period. In the sixteenth century, religion would have made by Pyrrhonism a powerful apologetic tool, true weapon that adverse confessions would have set against each other. Nevertheless, as Bayle notes it in its Dictionary, the connection between scepticism and theology is extremely ambiguous : a fast outline of the appreciations carried by the Christian theologians shows that, by protestants as well as by Catholics, the humiliation of natural lights is thought as an obstacle of the institution of faith. Only the Paulinian and mystic currents see in such a philosophy a beneficial resource for spiritual life. To become an intellectual tool recognized in the catholic Tridentin circles, Pyrrhonism must have been subjected to a radical transformation : Omer Talon, followed by Gentian Hervet, has restructured Pyrrhonism from the probabilistic model of the New Academy, even though such a model was rejected by Sextus Empiricus. Such mitigated, scepticism has then been considered as one of the privileged means of the refondation of rationalistic dialectic, and of the defence of faith. (shrink)

Cet article développe un argument destiné à montrer que la conception des lois de nature chez Hobbes, ainsi que la conception de leurs relations avec les raisons de l’action, l’obligation et la rationalité individuelle, sont des repères importants pour les débats contemporains sur les limites de la conception de la rationalité individuelle en termes de maximisation unilatérale de l’avantage personnel. Les vues de Hobbes ont un intérêt permanent à la fois pour les théoriciens de la décision et pour les philosophes (...) moralistes ou politologues, puisque de nombreux théoriciens moraux ou politiques estiment que la moralité et la rationalité individuelle devraient coïncider à un certain niveau au moins. On essaie ici de montrer que certains problèmes intrigants qui demeurent peuvent être abordés d’une manière satisfaisante, dans des cas limités, dans un modèle cognitiviste unifié de la rationalité pratique individuelle, selon une direction hobbesienne.In this article, it is argued that Hobbes’s conception of the laws of nature is a truly important focal point for contemporary debates on the limits of unilateral advantage-maximizing views of individual rationality. The Hobbesian views have permanent interest both for decision theorists and for moral and political philosophers, since many moral and political thinkers hold that morality and individual rationality should coincide at some level at least. It is argued that some of the remaining, puzzling problems in reconciling individual rationality and morality can be dealt with satisfactorily in some limited cases in a unified cognitive model of individual practical rationality, following a Hobbesian direction. (shrink)

Christian Emden’s book is a contribution to the current debates in the English-language literature over Nietzsche’s “naturalism.” Emden regards this subject as “crucial to any understanding of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical thought”, claiming that the “central task of Nietzsche’s philosophical project” is to “translate humanity back into nature,” as Nietzsche himself puts it in BGE 230. However, Emden does not undertake to demonstrate this thesis as such. Rather, he aims to interpret Nietzsche’s naturalism in terms of the “problem of normativity”, that (...) of how the sources of normativity can be understood without appealing to a normative standard independent of us as natural beings.... (shrink)

We observed that despite international declarations on child-rights, outsourced domestic girl-child labour still persists. Raising the question whether outsourced domestic girl-child labour constitutes hermeneutical injustice, we respond affirmatively. Relying on two indigenous victimology-narratives that are newspaper reports, we expose some of the horrors that the victims of outsourced domestic girl-child labour suffer. Comparing these reports with other victimology-narratives of hermeneutical injustice as reported by Miranda Fricker and Hilkje Hänel, we argue that the victims of outsourced domestic girl-child labour suffer a (...) hermeneutical gap and hermeneutical interference; and that the perpetuators of this practice, help to foster what we call ‘hermeneutical obstruction’. We recommend different counteracting measures such as: a radical feminization of educational curricula, which will allow for the introduction of the relevant hermeneutical resources that female children need in making sense of their experiences, into the classrooms and other places of learning; establishing feminist liberation agencies in all schools, religious institutions and hospitals, as ways of increasing the level of awareness about the rights of the girl-child in children and adults; feminizing legislation and legislative processes, to allow for the enactment of laws to protect the rights of the girl-child; and campaigning for a more rigorous enforcement of child-rights laws. (shrink)

Most writing on informed consent in Africa highlights different cultural and social attributes that influence informed consent practices, especially in research settings. This review presents a composite picture of informed consent in Nigeria using empirical studies and legal and regulatory prescriptions, as well as clinical experience. It shows that Nigeria, like most other nations in Africa, is a mixture of sociocultural entities, and, notwithstanding the multitude of factors affecting it, informed consent is evolving along a purely Western model.Empirical studies show (...) that 70–95% of Nigerian patients report giving consent for their surgical treatments. Regulatory prescriptions and adjudicated cases in Nigeria follow the Western model of informed consent. However, adversarial legal proceedings, for a multiplicity of reasons, do not play significant roles in enforcing good medical practice in Nigeria. Gender prejudices are evident, but not a norm. Individual autonomy is recognized even when decisions are made within the family. Consent practices are influenced by the level of education, extended family system, urbanization, religious practices, and health care financing options available. All limitations notwithstanding, consent discussions improved with increasing level of education of the patients, suggesting that improved physician's knowledge and increasing awareness and education of patients can override other influences.Nigerian medical schools should restructure their teaching of medical ethics to improve the knowledge and practices of physicians. More research is needed on the preferences of the Nigerian people regarding informed consent so as to adequately train physicians and positively influence physicians’ behaviors. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, EarlyView.

Résumé Le principe de précaution engage les rapports entre la connaissance, les risques et l’action ; appréhendé d’un point de vue simultanément éthique et politique, il pose également un défi aux institutions et au public pour ce qui est de sa mobilisation dans le débat et de sa mise en œuvre dans l’action, en tant que principe possédant une portée générale. L’article propose une description des problèmes spécifiques que comporte, à cet égard, le choix des interprétations. Cette description conduit à (...) une appréciation positive du nouveau rôle dévolu aux démarches participatives dans la discussion des enjeux éthiques et des risques acceptables. (shrink)

Psychological assessment has long been reported as a key component of clinical psychology. This paper examined and shed light on the complexities surrounding the clinical significance of therapeutic approach to treatment Planning. To achieve this objective, the paper searched and used the PsycINFO and PubMed databases and the reference sections of chapters and journal articles to analysed the underlying themes: 1) a strong basis for the usage of therapeutic approach to psychological assessment in treatment plans, 2) explained the conceptual meaning (...) of clinical significant change in therapeutic assessment, 3) used initial theory to explain the therapeutic mechanisms of change in clinical practice, 4) analysed the empirically documenting clinically significant change in therapeutic assessment. Finally, the study suggested that though therapeutic assessment is not sufficient for the systematic study of psychotherapy outcome and process, it is still consistent with both the lay-man and professional expectations regarding treatment outcome and also provides a precise method for classifying clients as “changed” or “unchanged” on the basis of clinical significance criteria. (shrink)